DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 217 479 CS 207 030

AUTHOR Woal, Michael B.
TITLE Defamiliarization in Television Viewing: Aesthetic and Rhetorical Modes of Experiencing Television.
PUB DATE Jul 82
NOTE 18p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism (65th, Athens, OH, July 25-28, 1982).

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Identification (Psychology); *Mass Media Effects; Media Research; *Rhetoric; *Rhetorical Criticism; Television; *Television Viewing; *Theories
IDENTIFIERS *Audience Response; *Defamiliarization (Concept)

ABSTRACT

The proposition advanced by media critics John Fiske and John Hartley, that television provides the experience of "defamiliarization" (the demand that viewers "negotiate" a response to the ideological frameworks that television presents), is considered by the Russian Formalist critics and the structuralists who elaborated and refined their ideas as being the distinctive effect of art. In general, symbolic discourse provokes either aesthetic or rhetorical experience; and whether the aesthetic or the rhetorical mode obtains depends upon the interaction between the features of the discourse and the orientation of the recipient. Kenneth Burke's conception of rhetoric supports the distinction that while aesthetic experience is defamiliarizing and transcategorical, with its essence being awareness of the processes of perception and categorization, rhetorical experience is familiarizing and categorizing, with its essence being the confirmation or modification of schemata and of perceptual and ideological categories. The idea that television viewing generates the aesthetic experience of defamiliarization stems from a failure to distinguish between these two modes of experiencing discourse. By presenting ideological frameworks toward which viewers negotiate a response, television invites rhetorical response, making it not an art, but a variety of discourse. (FL)

**********
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
**********

ED217479

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
☒ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

QUALITATIVE STUDIES
CO-WINNER, GRADUATE STUDENT RESEARCH
PAPER COMPETITION

# DEFAMILIARIZATION IN TELEVISION VIEWING: AESTHETIC AND RHETORICAL MODES OF EXPERIENCING TELEVISION

By

Michael B. Woal
Doctoral Candidate

Department of Speech Communication
The Pennsylvania State University

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Michael B. Woal
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

CS207030

Presented to the Qualitative Studies Division at the Association for Education in Journalism Annual Convention in Athens, Ohio, July 1982.

## Introduction

The idea of defamiliarization originated with the Russian Formalist critic Victor Shklovsky as a formula to characterize aesthetic discourse and set it apart from non-art. In 1917 Shklovksy explained the peculiar defamiliarizing nature of art in these terms: "The technique of art is to make objects 'unfamiliar,' to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged."[1] Recently this concept has been applied by John Fiske and John Hartley to television as a variety of discourse.[2] Their critical effort is promising for an understanding of how television affects its viewers, but its results are seriously flawed by the authors' inadequate understanding of defamiliarization. This essay looks at Fiske and Hartley's inadequacies and goes on to propose that television is not art but rather a variety of rhetoric.

Fiske and Hartley used the concept of defamiliarization to describe the interaction of television with its viewers and to elucidate the significance of that interaction. They characterized defamiliarization as follows:

> It is often claimed that certain great artists, for instance Joyce, Kafka, Brecht, or Sterne in Tristram Shandy, are able to "defamiliarize" the established conventions of thought and perception. Defamiliarization is a term borrowed from Russian Formalist criticism....It describes the way these writers hesitate or hold back from producing sense in their messages, thereby demonstrating the arbitrary nature of the codes with which we are familiar. They thus demystify our perception of reality, which emerges as 'real-seeming', rather than as reality itself. The effect of this effort, it is claimed, is to confront the reader with his true place in the ideological framework of his society. Defamiliarization rescues the individual from a 'consumerist' role. The inclusion of such 'messages' as Ulysses or The Trial or The Resistable Rise of Arturo Ui into the stream of products of the novel or theatre genres serves to isolate the conventions of the mainstream and thus expose them to view.[3]

Fiske and Hartley then applied the defamiliarization concept to television viewing:

> We are certainly not suggesting that we are constantly and consciously defamiliarizing the [television] message in order to critique or isolate the ideological framework within which we live. What we do suggest is that taking television as we find it, we, the audience, are spontaneously and continuously confronted with this framework and must negotiate a stance towards it in order to decode and thus enjoy the entertainment in which it is embodied.[4]

The defamiliarization idea, in this sense of the demand (or, if that word is too strong, the invitation) that viewers "negotiate" a response to the ideological frameworks which television presents, functions for Fiske and Hartley as the basis of the social-psychological importance of television viewing: The "ordinary viewer" acquires "the power...of recognizing for himself his own situation in all its complexities and contradictions."[5]

This essay assumes that Shklovsky's identification of defamiliarization as the hallmark of the aesthetic ought to be understood functionally rather than substantively. In other words, defamiliarization is the distinctive effect of discourse functioning aesthetically, not of an entity which is aesthetic discourse. It will be shown that this functional interpretation is consonant with the ideas of the Structuralist theorists and critics who were the heirs of Russian Formalism. In maintaining that television acts "as an agency of defamiliarization"[6] Fiske and Hartley failed to distinguish between two very different functions of symbolic discourse--functions which may be called the aesthetic and the rhetorical.

As Fiske and Hartley said, television presents ideological frameworks. Such content may be a vehicle for eliciting defamiliarization, for emphasizing "the process of perception" as the "aesthetic end in itself."[7] But it may also be an occasion for calling attention to the ideology per se. Which mode of apprehension occurs is determined somewhat by the qualities of the programming

and somewhat by the interests and intentions of the viewer. It is appropriate to begin to delineate these aesthetic and rhetorical modes by re-examining Shklovsky's idea of defamiliarization.

## Shklovskian Defamiliarization: The Aesthetic Mode

Shklovsky developed the concept of defamiliarization in reaction to a prevailing aesthetic orthodoxy whose central tenet was that poetry (a term used here as a synonym for art) is "a way of thinking in images...which permits... 'economy of mental effort'."[8] This thesis involves two notions: that the essence of art is imagery, and that the perceiver's experience of art exhibits a "principle of the economy of creative effort."[9]

The first idea was familiar to Shklovsky and his Formalist colleagues from the work of the nineteenth century philologist Alexander Potebnya. ("Without imagery there is not art, and in particular no poetry.")[10] Shklovsky noted that the definition of art as thinking in images was not merely a critical relic, but was actively espoused by "the theorists of the Symbolist movement"[11] who were his contemporaries. For Potebnyaism, images in art have a familiarizing function:

> Since the purpose of imagery is to remind us, by approximation, of those meanings for which the image stands, and since, apart from this, imagery is unnecessary for thought, we must be more familiar with the image than with what it clarifies.[12]

Shklovsky remarked that, "Potebnya and his numerous disciples...feel that the purpose of imagery is to help channel various objects and activities into groups and to clarify the unknown by means of the known."[13]

Shklovsky offered two arguments against the Potebnyan notion of imagery. The first attacks the idea that imagery is the essence of art. If imagery is "the chief characteristic of poetry" then one should expect

> the history of 'imagistic art'...to consist of a history of changes in imagery. But we find that images change little....The works of poets are classified or grouped according to the new techniques that poets discover and share, and according to their arrangement and development of the resources of language; poets are much more concerned with arranging images than with creating them.[14]

Shklovsky's second argument refutes Potebnya's idea of the familiarizing function of images:

> Potebnya did not distinguish between the language of poetry [i.e., "art"] and the language of prose [i.e., "non-art"]. Consequently, he ignored the fact that there are two aspects of imagery: imagery as a practical means of thinking, as a means of placing objects within categories; and imagery as poetic, as a means of reinforcing an impression....Poetic imagery is a means of creating the strongest possible impression ....As a method it is...neither more or less effective than other poetic techniques.[15]

Shklovsky also noted the basis for an argument (though he did not develop it) against Potebnyaism which is much more impressive than his rather theoretical objections. He referred to a variety of imagery (his example is "Gogol's comparison of the sky to the garment of God"[16]) which compares the familiar to the exceptional, rather than vice versa. It is easy to amass evidence for this empirical argument against Potebnya's concept of the function of imagery. Further, it is easy to show empirically that the idea of art as thinking in images is itself inadequate. Much of what is generally accepted as poetry is simply not image-laden. (Shklovsky's translators, Lee Lemon and Marion Reis, cite Wordsworth's lines: "The world is too much with us; late and soon,/ Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers:".[17]) The empirical argument is perhaps the most telling objection to the thesis that poetry equals imagery.

In rebutting the idea that the function of imagery is to make familiar what is unfamiliar, Shklovsky disposed of the related element of critical dogma which he called the "law of the economy of creative effort."[18] This notion, which he attributed to Herbert Spencer and the philologist Alexander

Veselovsky among others, asserted that "To so present ideas that they may be apprehended with the least possible mental effort, is the desideratum...in composition."[19] Imagery that familiarizes is obviously conducive to an economy of mental effort. However, since imagery often works in just the opposite way, its general purpose cannot be to promote the apprehension of ideas with minimal creative effort. In sum, Shklovsky had demonstrated, at least to his satisfaction, that poetry (and art in general) is not thinking in images, and is not dedicated to delivering the greatest amount of thought with the least effort of perception.

The traditional ideas about poetry, said Shklovsky, "are perhaps true in their application to 'practical' language...however...they do not distinguish properly between the laws of practical language and the laws of poetic language."[20] Practical language is governed by the "general laws of perception," of which Shklovsky wrote:

> we see that as perception becomes habitual, it becomes automatic...all of our habits retreat into the area of the unconsciously automatic...the over-automatization of an object, permits the greatest economy of perceptive effort.[21]

By contrast,

> art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things...the technique of art is to make objects "unfamiliar"...to increase the difficulty and length of perception.[22]

Shklovsky's aesthetic thesis stood traditional thinking about art on its head: Art does not make familiar what is strange; it "makes strange" that which is familiar and automatized. (Shklovsky used the term "ostraneniye," which literally means "making strange."[23]) Furthermore, art strives not for economy of mental effort but to increase the difficulty and length of perception.

One further point is crucial to Shklovskian aesthetics. For Potebnya

the image was the "fixed predicate"[24] of its subject. In other words, art, as imagery, categorizes objects according to their qualities. But, for Shklovsky, art is not about objects at all--it is about the process of perception,

> because the process of perception is an end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not important.[25]

The object which is defamiliarized (i.e., that which is the subject of the work of art) is important only because it plays a part in bringing about the experience of defamiliarized perception, the experience of artfulness as opposed to automatization.

## Fiske-Hartleyan "Defamiliarization": the Rhetorical Mode

The defamiliarization which Shklovsky found in aesthetic experience is clearly different from the experience which Fiske and Hartley likened to defamiliarization in television viewing: confrontation with an idealogical framework toward which the audience must "negotiate a stance."[26] For Shklovsky confrontation with a defamiliarized ideology leads to aesthetic experience insofar as it draws attention to the nature of the processes by which ideologies are generated and perceived by men. It is in this sense that Shklovsky regarded the process of perception as the end-in-itself of aesthetic experience. By contrast Fiske and Hartley saw defamiliarization as leading to the construction of a new relationship between the experiencing subject and the defamiliarized object.

The difference between these two views is both subtle and fundamental. For Shklovsky defamiliarization is transcategorical, and the essence of the aesthetic experience which it engenders is awareness of the categorizing process. For Fiske and Hartley defamiliarization is re-categorizing, and it leads to the negotiation of new relationships to objects, or, what amounts

to the same thing, to new categories of perception. Of course Shklovskian defamiliarization is also followed by the formulation of new categories (new automatizations), but it is the transcendence of categories which constitutes the peculiar nature of the aesthetic.

The difference between Shklovsky and Fiske and Hartley is reflected in their different regard for the object. For Fiske and Hartley defamiliarization of the object requires the perceiver to negotiate a stance towards it. For Shklovsky defamiliarization leads to awareness of the process of perception; "the object is not important."[27]

Shklovsky considered defamiliarization to be "the technique of art."[28] In his terms the experience of television of which Fiske and Hartley spoke is not aesthetic experience at all. Consequently television programming which prompts Fiske and Hartley's viewers to negotiate a stance to ideological frameworks is not, in Shklovskian terms, a work of art (or, more exactly, such television programming does not function as a work of art for such viewers since their experience with it is not aesthetic. Incidently Fiske and Hartley's claim that television audiences negotiate a stance to an ideological framework "in order to decode and thus enjoy the entertainment in which it is embodied"[29] does nothing to diminish the distance between their ideas about television viewing and Shklovsky's concept of aesthetic experience. Rather it underscores the great differences between these two notions.)

Fiske and Hartley's departure from the original sense of Shklovsky's idea of defamiliarization, and the application of their version of defamiliarization to television viewing, raise several questions of interest: To the extent that television does not function as do works of art, and that viewing is not aesthetic experience, how should this discourse and its mode of reception be understood? What features distinguish it from the aesthetic?

What are the circumstances under which television viewing would constitute aesthetic experience in Shklovsky's sense of the aesthetic? Finally how is a critical understanding of television enhanced by the delineation of these two distinct modes of experience?

These questions suggest functional differentiation within television viewing. As this essay's introduction suggests, the sort of television experience which Fiske and Hartley described is rhetorical as opposed to aesthetic. Rhetorical is an apt term because, at the heart of television viewing, Fiske and Hartley saw the working out of partisan responses to ideological issues. This activity is characteristic of the domain of rhetoric. As Kenneth Burke wrote in explanation of his title, A Rhetoric of Motives,

> The Rhetoric deals with the possibilities of classification in its partisan aspects; it considers the ways in which individuals are at odds with one another, or become identified with groups more or less at odds with one another ....Rhetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall.[30]

Burke's words call attention to the characteristic difference between rhetorical and aesthetic experience. The former emphasizes the establishment of categories (it deals with the possibilities of classification); the latter centers upon the transcendence of categories. Hence rhetorical experience is partisan in that individuals or groups, having negotiated their stances toward ideological frameworks, find those positions to be potentially at odds. As Burke observed, "one need not scrutinize the concept of 'identification' [with a partisan position] very sharply to see, implied in it at every turn, its ironic counterpart: division."[31] On the other hand, aesthetic experience is universal, since it draws attention to the processes of symbol construction and perception in which all men are involved, whatever their ideological leanings. (Of course there remains great individual variation as to the efficacy of any particular work of art for precipitating aesthetic experience.)

The functional differentiation of various forms of language was a central concern of the Structuralist theorists and critics who greatly expanded and refined Shklovsky's concepts. Their ideas can be fruitfully applied in discussing aesthetic and rhetorical modes in television viewing.

## Aesthetic Language and Practical Language

Whether television programming is experienced as aesthetic or rhetorical is determined by two classes of factors. One is the attitude of the viewer. His character, his accumulated experience with art in general and with television in particular, and his immediate interest in attending to television will incline him to assimilate specific programming in an aesthetic or rhetorical mode. The other determinant includes features of television programming itself which invite a particular form of response. The mode of experience almost always encouraged by television is the rhetorical. The best way to demonstrate this may be to point out first features of language which Structuralist scholars of language and literature found conducive to aesthetic experience (and whose analogues are rarely found in television programming).

Structuralists developed the notion of "foregrounding" to characterize poetic (i.e., aesthetic) language. Bohuslav Havranek described foregrounding as

> the use of the devices of the language in such a way that this use itself attracts attention and is perceived as uncommon, as deprived of automatization, as deautomatized, such as a live poetic metaphor....We find maximum foregrounding, used for its own sake...in poetic language.[32]

Jan Mukarovsky pointed out that the background against which foregrounding occurs is "dual: the norm of the standard language and the traditional esthetic canon."[33]

It is easy to see that foregrounding serves precisely the functions which Shklovsky required of aesthetic language: "to make objects 'unfamiliar',

to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception."[34] Roman Jakobson (who coined the term "Structuralism" in 1929) noted that the foregrounding of poetic language "deepens the fundamental dichotomy of signs and objects."[35] This is not the place to delve into the Structuralists' rather sophisticated notions of aesthetic and non-aesthetic signs, but Jakobson's remark indicates the sense in which foregrounding and defamiliarization are connected. His idea was echoed by Terrence Hawkes in terms which make very clear the way in which foregrounding in aesthetic language produces defamiliarization:

> it is of the distinctive essence of the aesthetic use of language...that it is...concerned above all to draw attention to its own nature...As a result it systematically undermines the sense of any 'natural'... connection between...sign and object.[36]

In contrast to the foregrounding of aesthetic language, practical language (i.e., language which functions rhetorically) is marked by "automatization," which Havranek described as

> such a use of the devices of language...as is usual for a certain expressive purpose...the communication occurs, and is received, as conventional in linguistic form.[37]

Foregrounding is a positive departure from conventional usage. Mukarovsky spoke of it as "the esthetically intentional distortion of the linguistic components of the work, the intentional violation of the norm."[38] Automatization, on the other hand, may be thought of as a kind of backgrounding, a term which appropriately suggests that practical language does not draw attention to its own nature.

What is emphasized in practical language is that which is usually thought of as content. Maria Mayenowa spoke of the roles of content in practical and aesthetic language as follows:

> An ordinary [i.e., non-aesthetic] message refers to a concrete reality...In art, however, the reality which a work presents...is...only a factor enabling it to come into being.[39]

The idea here is that defamiliarization in aesthetic experience characterizes a particular sort of relationship between subject and object (between perceiver and content), a relationship which is produced by foregrounding and which emphasizes the relation itself (i.e., the "process of perception" is the "aesthetic end in itself"[40]). Hence the content of a work of art is only one factor in the relation which constitutes the work's true subject. This is very different from the emphasis on a specific reality which is the content of practical discourse.

## Conclusions: Television Viewing as Rhetorical Experience

Mukarovsky cited a "dual" background of foregrounding in poetry: "the norm of the standard language and the traditional esthetic canon."[41] Insofar as the reader is familiar with poetic tradition, he will tend to react to instances of poetic speech as innovative or conventional in terms of their relationships to establish poetic practice (i.e., the aesthetic canon). Beyond that, the standard language functions as a background against which foregrounding is effective.

A case can be made that televisual techniques may be foregrounded in relation to a natural audio-visual code in the same sense that poetic devices are foregounded against the standard language. Such techniques as the juxtaposition of scenes of widely separated locales, and instantaneous cutting between wide and close-up shots, are instances of foregounding in relation to natural ways of seeing and hearing. But such devices have also become codified in a conventional canon of televisual technique akin to the traditional aesthetic canon of poetic language. Every viewer is familiar with

television's technical canon, and it is the rare television program that departs from that canon by innovatively foregrounding elements of its means of expression. Hence viewers experience the devices of television language as expected automatizations: "Television, a highly conventional medium, constantly uses signs that teeter on the brink of becoming cliches."[42] Aesthetic language is marked by "the consistency and systematic character of foregrounding."[43] The symbolic discourse of television is the antinomy of this; it is the language of rhetoric, not art.

To the extent that television viewing involves confrontations with ideological frameworks toward which viewers must "negotiate a stance,"[44] it is a rhetorical activity in the Burkean sense already discussed. Fiske and Hartley observed that the ideological frameworks presented by television are typically "very close to the culture's collective center."[45] It is therefore doubtful that most viewers are moved by most programming to re-evaluate their ideological affiliations. Television experience usually confirms rather than disturbs the ideological stances of viewers. However such confirmation of partisan positions attests, as much as does re-negotiation of such positions, to the salience of rhetorical objects as television content.

This essay's discussion of the Shklovskian concept of defamiliarization led to the idea that television viewing is rhetorical rather than aesthetic experience. Fiske and Hartley's application of the aesthetic notion of defamiliarization to television viewing was revealed as a misappropriation because they confused the aesthetic, trans-categorical experience of defamiliarization with the re-categorizing activity to which specific instances of that kind of activity lead. Discussion of the practical character of the language of television, and the kind of confrontations with rhetorical objects which it offers, amplified and supported the thesis that television programming is

a variety of rhetorical discourse. In its language, in the relationship between its viewers and its content, and in its experiential quality television is not aesthetic, but rhetorical.

In discussing "Aesthetic Language and Practical Language," it was noted that viewers' experiences with television are determined by individual interests as well as by features of the programming. For some individuals certain programming may precipitate aesthetic experience. However since television invites the rhetorical mode of response, aesthetic decoding of its programming may generally be regarded as aberrant. Television viewing is not conducive to the defamiliarization of aesthetic experience.

## Notes

1. V. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, ed. L. Lemon and M. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), p. 12.
2. J. Fiske and J. Hartley, Reading Television (London: Methuen, 1978).
3. Ibid., p. 18.
4. Ibid., p. 19; emphasis in original.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 12.
8. Ibid., p. 5.
9. Ibid., p. 10
10. A. Potebnya, Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti [Notes on the theory of language], p. 83, cited by Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 5.
11. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 7.
12. Potebnya, Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti, p. 291, cited by Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 6.
13. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 6.
14. Ibid., p. 7.
15. Ibid., p. 8.
16. Ibid., p. 6.
17. L. Lemon and M. Reis, Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), p. 4.
18. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 9.
19. H. Spencer, The Philosophy of Style, pp. 2-3, cited by Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 9.

20. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 10.

21. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

22. Ibid., p. 12; emphasis supplied.

23. Lemon and Reis, Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, p. 4, note 4.

24. Potebnya, Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti, p. 314, cited by Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 6.

25. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 12; emphasis in original.

26. Fiske and Hartley, Reading Television, p. 19.

27. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 12; emphasis in original.

28. Ibid.

29. Fiske and Hartley, Reading Television, p. 19.

30. K. Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), pp. 22-23; emphasis in original.

31. Ibid., p. 23.

32. B. Havranek, "The Functional Differentiation of the Standard Language," in A Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure, and Style, ed. P. Garvin (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1964), pp. 10-11; emphases in original.

33. J. Mukarovsky, "Standard Language and Poetic Language," in A Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure, and Style, ed. P. Garvin (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1964), p. 22.

34. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 12.

35. R. Jakobson, "Closing statement: linguistics and Poetics," in Style in Language, ed. T. Sebeok (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1960), p. 356.

36. T. Hawkes, Structuralism & Semiotics, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) p. 86: emphases in original.

37. Havranek, "The Differentiation of the Standard Language," p. 9.

38. Mukarovsky, "Standard Language and Poetic Language," p. 18.

39. M. Mayenowa, "Classic Statements of the Semiotic Theory of Art," in Sound, Sign and Meaning: Quinquagenary of the Prague Linguistic Circle, ed. L. Matejka (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978), p. 428.

40. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," p. 12.

41. Mukarovsky, "Standard Language and Poetic Language," p. 22.

42. Fiske and Hartley, Reading Television, p. 63.

43. Mukarovsky, "Standard Language and Poetic Language," p. 20.

44. Fiske and Hartley, Reading Television, p. 19.

45. Ibid., p. 79.